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Saul Krikpe’s skeptical argument and skeptical 
solution concerning rule-following are quite well known (cf. 
Kripke 1982). As an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s view, it 
seems to has a basis in Wittgenstein’s writings such as the 
following remarks: “And how can it [a rule] guide us, when 
its expression can after all be interpreted by us both thus 
and otherwise? I.e. when all various regularities 
correspond to it” (Wittgenstein 1978, 347) It is in the spirit 
of such a passage that Kripke starts his own unusual 
reading of Wittgenstein’s views on rule-following. In 
particular he considers the case that in teaching a rule 
such as ‘addition’ to a person, the number of examples 
actually shown is finite. Various rules would be compatible 
with such a finite number of examples. So there seems to 
be no reason to insist that the teacher teaches, or the pupil 
learns, a particular rule rather than any of the other 
possible rules. Against this, one may want to cite a fact 
which can be used to single out one particular regularity. 
But Kripke goes on to show that various possible 
candidates that may constitute such a fact are all wanting. 
Thus he concludes that there is no matter of the fact as to 
what an expression or rule means, a dire consequence 
that seems to obliterate meaning and even mental 
contents, his skeptical solution in terms of communal 
agreement notwithstanding.  
In Kripke’s argument, it is not only a single rule 
that is subject to different interpretations, but rather that, as 
Wittgenstein puts it, “However many rules you give me—I 
give a rule which justifies my employment of your rules” 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 79). Let us call the fact that a rule or a 
set of rules can be variously interpreted as the 
interpretability of rules. It would then seem that it plays an 
pernicious role in leading toward the obliteration of 
meaning. But Wittgenstein does not seem to take it that 
way, as attested by the following remarks: “But, that 
everything can (also) be interpreted as following, doesn’t 
mean that everything is following” (Wittgenstein 1978, 
414). Here he seems to suggest that there is a way of 
making the interpretability harmless, as long as it is seen in 
the right light. But how can something be interpreted as 
following a rule and yet it is not really following that rule? 
What is the distinction between the two cases?  
To get a glimpse of what Wittgenstein has to say 
to questions like these, we may first look at two of the 
prominent attempts which want to save Wittgenstein from 
Kripke. They are those made by Cora Diamond and John 
McDowell. What Diamond wants to point out, as a way of 
avoiding Kripke’s skeptical argument, is that when a 
person teaches, say, the rule of “adding 2” to a pupil, he 
does not mean to teach the pupil to do the impossible job 
of picking out, from among all the possibilities, the correct 
sequence. Rather, the success of the teaching depends 
very much on the pupil’s uptakes and responses (Diamond 
1991, 68-69). This seems to imply that the distinction 
between “being interpreted as following” and “is following” 
is to be made by appealing to the pupil’s uptakes and 
responses. McDowell, on the other hand, criticizes Kripke 
for his “…mistaken idea that grasping a rule is always an 
interpretation” (McDowell 1998, 238), or “…the assumption 
…that the understanding on which I act when I obey an 
order must be an interpretation” (McDowell 1998, 236). 
Instead, “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation” (Wittgenstein 1968, §201). Such a way of 
grasping a rule, according to McDowell, is made possible 
for a person by his being initiated into a practice (McDowell 
1998, 238). Again, this seems to imply that the distinction 
between “being interpreted as following” and “is following” 
can be made by appealing to practice.  
Now let us turn to Wittgenstein. He gives a gloss to 
the phenomenon that although we ordinarily do know the 
rule of “adding 2”, we nevertheless think that what we are 
taught are compatible with different regularities. Thus he 
remarks that: 
What happens is not that this symbol cannot be 
further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting. I do not 
interpret because I feel natural in the present picture. 
When I interpret, I step from one level of my thought to 
another. 
If I see the thought symbol “from outside”, I 
become conscious that it could be interpreted thus or thus; 
if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a 
stopping-place that is natural to me, and its further 
interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have 
a railway time-table and use it without being concerned 
with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various 
ways. (Wittgenstein 1974,147) 
It is then clear that, according to Wittgenstein, a 
rule can indeed be interpreted differently, when it is seen 
“from outside”, or when we step from one level of our 
thought to another. But what is to see a rule “from outside” 
or to step from one level to another? The following from 
Wittgenstein seems quite suggestive: “What, in a 
complicated surrounding, we call ‘following a rule’ we 
should certainly not call that if it stood in isolation” 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 335). Equally suggestive is: “‘Then 
according to you everybody could continue the series as 
he likes; and so infer anyhow!’ In that case we shan’t call it 
‘continuing the series’ and also presumably not ‘inference’” 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 80). If read together with the passage 
quoted before—“But, that everything can (also) be 
interpreted as following, doesn’t mean that everything is 
following”—these two passages seems to be saying that 
following a rule has its complicated surrounding and that to 
interpret a rule in a “deviant” way is to rid of the rule of 
such a complicated surrounding, and without such a 
surrounding it is no longer counted as following the rule, 
interpretability notwithstanding. To look at the rule “from 
outside” would then be to isolate it from the needed 
surrounding. 
But what then is the complicated surrounding of a 
rule? And what is it to isolate a rule from its complicated 
surrounding? “But this is important, namely that this 
reaction [to a rule], which is our guarantee of 
understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular 
circumstances, particular forms of life and speech.” 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 414) “As we employ the word ‘order’ 
and ‘obey’, gestures no less than words are intertwined in 
a net of multifarious relationships. If I am construing a 
simplified case, it is not clear whether I ought still to call 
the phenomenon ‘ordering’ and ‘obeying’” (RFM, VI-48). 
The complicated surrounding thus includes particular 
circumstances, particular forms of life and speech, and 
even gestures. And if we keep in mind the complexity of a 
form of life, we may even just say that the surrounding of a 
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rule is the form of life in which it is embedded. What 
Diamond calls the (natural) uptakes and responses of a 
learner of rules would then be part of the surrounding. To 
have a feel about how much the complicated surrounding 
may encompass, let us look at a case discussed by 
Wittgenstein. After pointing out that we should not take 
whichever (deviant) way of counting as correct, 
Wittgenstein continues: 
For what we call “counting” is an important part of 
our life’s activities. Counting and calculating are not—
e.g.—simply a pastime. Counting (and that means: 
counting like this) is a technique that is employed daily in 
the most various operations of our lives. And that is why 
we learn to count as we do: with endless practice, with 
merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted 
that we shall say “two” after “one”, “three” after “two” and 
so on. (Wittgenstein 1978, 37) 
In addition to significantly referring to techniques, 
this passage serves to indicate how a rule corresponding 
to a particular regularity is to be singled out or instilled in a 
child. Similarly, “And thinking and inferring (like counting) is 
of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but 
by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be 
called the role of thinking and inferring in our life” 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 80). 
But then what is it to look at a rule “from outside”? 
From what we have said before, to see a rule “from 
outside” is to isolate the rule from its surrounding. But what 
more can we say about such an isolation? If it is the 
surrounding that enables us to regard one particular 
regularity as the regularity, then it is the same surrounding 
that enables the pupil to learn the particular regularity 
without having to choose from among all the possibilities. 
The latter is made possible, according to Diamond, by the 
pupil’s uptakes and responses. The exclusion of such 
uptakes and responses would then account for, at least in 
part, the interpretability of a rules, and hence the reason 
why choosing from among all the possibilities seems 
inevitable, if one is to know how to follow a rule. We have 
mentioned some of the ingredients of the complicated 
surrounding of a rule. But what needs to be emphasized is 
that the ingredients are, to use Wittgenstein’s words, 
“intertwined in a net of multifarious relationships’ 
(Wittgenstein 1978, 352), a fact Diamond correctly 
stresses (Diamond 1989).  
Our answer about what surrounding is excluded, 
when a rule is seen “from Outside”, can in fact be 
generalized In On Certainty Wittgenstein makes the 
following remarks: “Our rules leave loop-holes, and the 
practice has to speak for itself” (Wittgenstein 1969, § 139). 
It is such practice which, on the one hand, helps to give 
content to a rule and, on the other hand, which is carried 
out without the guidance of rules. Practice in this sense is 
what one does or capable of doing, not what one thinks or 
is conscious of . It is what Kjell Johannessen calls pre-
knowledge or foreknowledge (Johannessen1988, 357). 
What is especially important about such foreknowledge is 
that it helps to determine the meaning of a rule, as 
“[I]nterpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning” (Wittgenstein 1968, § 198). Equally important is 
that foreknowledge cannot be fully captured by sentences 
or propositions. The significance of this can be brought out 
by looking at what can be termed sententialism, a position 
we can attribute to Donald Davidson. 
As a way of avoid the inscrutability of reference, 
Hartry Field proposes that we take into consideration 
causal relation between a name or its use and what it 
refers to (cf. Davidson 2001, 235). But Davidson thinks 
that this maneuver would not work, for such a relation can 
be expressed by a sentence. And if any set of sentences 
can be differently interpreted, the addition of one more 
sentence would not change that, and hence the 
inscrutability of reference again. What Davidson does here 
is to take any connection between the use of a term and 
what it refers to as expressible in sentences, hence he is 
taken to be holding the position of sententialism. The 
sententialism with respect to rule-following would take any 
connection between (an expression of) a rule and acts the 
rule dictates as completely expressible in sentences. It 
then follows from well known facts (such as those one may 
find in model theory) that those sentences are individually 
or collectively subject to different interpretations. 
Sententialism would then correspond to seeing a rule “from 
outside”. And what sententialism excludes is the existence 
of foreknowledge, or practice when it is carefully delimited. 
But if practice or foreknowledge is what determines the 
meaning of a rule, then sententialism can at best be 
entertained as an abstraction, if it indeed can be so 
entertained at all. 
The sort of sententialism held by Davidson also 
has similar difficulties. If interpretation by itself does not 
determine the meaning of a rule, then a set of sentences 
do not determine their own meaning either. It may be said 
that it is their use that gives them meaning. And if 
Wittgenstein is right, their use had better be something like 
what we call foreknowledge or practice. When 
sententialism is taken for granted, though the 
interpretability of the set of sentences, with its existence as 
an abstraction, is guaranteed, the meaning of the set of 
sentences may still be out of sight. With this in mind, views 
such as the thesis of the indeterminacy and the thesis of 
the inscrutability of reference may need a second critical 
look. 
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